

5G Global event - security session
May 24, 2017 - Tokyo, Japan

Sylvain GUILLEY - Co-founder, director of the "Think Ahead" business line



Session Outline

Introduction about 5G and security

Presentation of panelists Koji Nakao Anand Prasad

Round table and discussion with the audience



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■ 5G security

### Sylvain Guilley

- Standard editor at ISO SC27 and active in TC CYBER of ETSI
- Design and evaluation of smart objects





- Professor in cryptographic engineering
- Research interest in side-channel and fault injection attacks

- Director of the *Think* Ahead business line
- In charge of innovation

### **CORPORATE PRESENTATION**

OUR ACTIVITY

WHAT DO WE DO?

SECURITY

















## FOR WHOM?







CERTIFICATION LABS



IC DESIGN HOUSES



AGENCIES

## FOR WHICH MARKETS?









#### **OUR VISION**

Going forward, there will be more and more interconnected devices or objects in various market verticals, this is what we call Internet of Things or Internet of Everything. All those objects being interconnected to the cloud, each and every object could be a threat for the whole network. Therefore the security of the objects or the devices is key. Even more, security will become one of the most important asset of the digital world.

#### CORPORATE PRESENTATION

#### ■ THE COMPANY



MORE THAN

15 YEARS OF RESEARCH

MORE THAN
200 PUBLICATIONS

SPIN-OFF FROM INSTITUT MINES-TELECOM













#### CORPORATE PRESENTATION

BUSINESS LINES

**PROTECT** 

SECURYZR

COMBINATION OF SMART UNITS AND EXPERTISE RESULTS **EVALUATE** 

LABORYZR

READY-TO-USE PRE AND POST-SILICON ANALYSIS PLATFORMS **SERVICE** 

EXPERTYZR

THE NEXT STEPS
TOWARDS
SECURITY
CHALLENGES

■ Security?

Yesterday, what were the security issues? Major security breaches identified in legacy networks

- 2G cryptography has been broken [BBK08]
- Man-in-the-middle attack successfully perpetrated between 3G-WLAN interworking [ZJWY10]
- 4G SIM cards have been cloned thanks to power-line analysis [LYS+15]

#### Applicable cyber attacks:

(a tsunami!)

Hardware Hardware trojans, counterfeited and/or repackaged devices, FIB, probing, DPA, EMA, etc.

Operating sys.

Buffer overrun, corrupted error management, insufficient verificiation of data authenticity, numeric errors, integer overflow/underflow. OS command injection, permissions, priviledges.

access control, race conditions, resource management error, time and state abuse, etc.

Application ROP, stack smashing, code injection, command injection, CSRF, XSS, format string vulnerability,

ion ROP, stack smashing, code injection, command injection, CSRF, XSS, format string vulnerability information leak / disclosure, link errors, path equivalence, path traversal, SQL injection, etc.

■ Security?


Today, yearly loss due to cyber attacks: **\$400 Billion** (Intel Security)

Today and tomorrow, we want E2E security for 5G:

- What does security means? ... it is vertical industry-dependent
- Where to secure? .....each node + its links
- ─ How to secure? ..... first need: to identify the threats


Security:

what for?



■ Security:

exemple of ransomware



■ Predicting security in 3 years with 5G?

Context: 5G communicates with the IoT

### Today, facts


- botnets (including IoT devices) are growing: Mirai, Hajime, etc.
- current attacks are seen by many as warning shots
- vulnerabilities are everywhere: hardware, OS, apps, etc.

#### **Future**

- More value in 5G means more attacks!
- Get prepared today!

■ Solution **①**: Security by design

5G + IoT (M2M) = CPS (Cyber Physical Systems)




Threats:

Rogue equipment
Malware
Downgrade
Hardware trojan
Tampering
Probing, FIB, etc.


■ Solution **①**: Security by design

The strength of a chain is the strength of its weakest element and/or link



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■ Solution **②**: Standardization effort

- International efforts:
  - ITU-T: Security
  - 3GP: SA WG3: Security
- Regional efforts:
  - **→** www.etsi.org/SECURITYWEEK and TC Cyber
  - \_ 5G ≥ Ensure under SEPP
  - European H2020 projects.
  - etc.

#### Coordination is needed!



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Panelists

### Koji Nakao



- Involved in ITU-T SG17 and ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27/WG4
- KDDI: "Information Security Fellow" to manage all the security issues
- NICT: "Group Leader" to manage research activities for network security technologies
- Steering committee member of Japan-France cybersecurity research group

Panelists

#### Anand Prasad



- Chairman of 3GPP SA3
- Member of the governing body of Global ICT Standardisation Forum for India (GISFI)
- Chief Advanced Technologist, Executive Specialist, at NEC Corporation, Japan



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| Round | table: | next ste | eps? |
|-------|--------|----------|------|
|       |        |          |      |

- How to coordinate cyber and telecom worlds?
- ─ How to interoperate with legacy networks?
- ─ How about creating security subgroups in 5G associations? How to coordinate the worldwide standardization?

Exemple of cautionary note: conflicting requirements

### Objectives of 5G

- high speed (10 Gbps),
- high capacity (10,000 simultaneous connections),

### Objectives of security

- AES encryption at 10 Gbps needs hardware acceleration
- Authentication of 10,000 devices also requires hardware acceleration
- RSA/ECC/post-quantum crypto ≪ 1 ms requires hardware acceleration

**Evaluation** 

and

Test



ISO/IEC 15408:2009



ISO/IEC 19790:2012

### ■ Bibliographical references

[LYS<sup>+</sup>15]

- [BBK08] Elad Barkan, Eli Biham, and Nathan Keller.
  Instant ciphertext-only cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communication.

  J. Cryptology, 21(3):392–429, 2008.
- Wei Sun, Yijie Ge, and Xinjun Xie.

  Small tweaks do not help: Differential power analysis of MILENAGE implementations in 3g/4g USIM cards.

  In Günther Pernul, Peter Y. A. Ryan, and Edgar R. Weippl, editors, Computer Security ESORICS 2015 20th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Vienna, Austria, September 21-25, 2015, Proceedings, Part I, volume 9326 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,

Junrong Liu, Yu Yu, Francois-Xavier Standaert, Zheng Guo, Dawu Gu,

[ZJWY10] Lizhuo Zhang, Weijia Jia, Sheng Wen, and Di Yao. A Man-in-the-Middle Attack on 3G-WLAN Interworking. In 2010 International Conference on Communications and Mobile Computing, volume 1, pages 121–125, April 2010. IEEE. Shenzhen, China.

pages 468-480. Springer, 2015.





#### **THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION**

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